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INTRODUCTION
Germany has been an essential contributor to, and an energetic partici-
pant in, the project of European integration. Germany lends Europe the
force of its national political will.' It has helped conceptualize and theo-
rize - through the work of generations of its intellectuals and scholars -
a framework for supranational governance at the European level.2 And its
indomitable industrial economy has helped to bankroll the costly process
of inching ever closer toward unity in Europe.3 To paraphrase the French
1.
Das europiische Einigungswerk bleibt die wichtigste Aufgabe Deutsch-
lands ....
Unser Land muss in dieser Situation als Griindungsmitglied der EU und
vertrauensvoller Partner eine verantwortungsvolle und integrationsf6rdernde
Rolle in Europa wahmehmen. Deutschland wird alle seine M6glichkeiten
nutzen und aussch6pfen, das Vertrauen in die Zukunftsfahigkeit des eu-
ropliischen Einigungswerkes wieder zu stirken und auszubauen.
(The work of uniting Europe remains Germany's most important pro-
ject ....
In this context, as a founding member of the EU, our land must embrace its
role as a trustworthy partner in a responsible process of integration. Germany
will seize and exhaust every possibility to strengthen and reinforce confidence
in the forward-looking potential of the work of uniting Europe.)
Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten: Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD 109 (Dec. 14,
2013) (Russell Miller trans.), available at https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/
koalitionsvertrag.pdf. See, e.g., Klaus Scharioth, Letter to the Editor, Germany's Commitment to European
Integration, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/opinion/128
germany.html?_r=0. See also TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, IN EUROPE'S NAME: GERMANY AND THE
DIVIDED CONTINENT (1994); GISELA HENDRIKS & ANNETTE MORGAN, THE FRANCO-GERMAN
Axis IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001).
2. See JORGEN HABERMAS, Die Krite der Europdischen Union im Lichte einer Konstituionalisierung des
Volkerechts - Ein Essay Zur Verfassung Europas, in ZUR VERFASSUNG EUROPAS: EIN ESSAY 39, 64
(2011). See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 EUR. L.J. 282 (1995); Jiirgen Ha-
bermas, Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?' 1 EUR. L.J. 303 (1995); Armin Von
Bogdandy, Founding Princryles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch, 16 EUR. L.J. 95 (2010);
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von Bogdandy & Jiirgen Bast eds., 2d
ed. 2009).
3. "Germany has been a net contributor to the [European Communities and European Union]
budget for many years. As a wealthy Member State with a relatively small farming sector, Germany
has over the years received only meagre resources from the structural funds and the [Common Agri-
cultural Policy]. Moreover, in the nineties, the negative German balance became even larger for a
number of reasons. In 1990 and 1991 economic growth in the Federal Republic far outstripped
growth in other Member States. This resulted in an increase in Germany's relative share of GNP and
hence in the financing of the Community." Herman Matthijs, The Budget ofthe European Union 13 (Inst.
For European Studies, IES Working Paper No. 4/2010, 2010), available at http://www.ies.be/files/
WP-4-2010-FINAIL_0.pdf. See Bernd Riegert, The EU Budget: Who Pays What?, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
June 11, 2012, http://www.dw.de/the-eu-budget-who-pays-what/a-16359517 ("According to the
European Commission, the largest net contributors include Germany (at 9 billion euros), France (6.4
billion), Italy (5.9 billion), Great Britain (5.6 billion) and the Netherlands (2.2 billion)."); EU budget:




political scientist Maurice Duverger, there can be no Europe without
Germany.4
But lately it would be fair to wonder if there can be a future for Europe
with Germany. Germany is increasingly pursuing its own interests, some-
times in conflict with what some see as its European commitments.' Per-
haps worse, many argue that Germany's Europapolitik (European policies)
are doing the project of integration grave harm.6 If Europe stumbles, if it
fails to achieve a fuller form of the "progressive federalism" for which
Duverger and generations of Europeanists have struggled, then there is a
widening conviction that no small measure of blame can be laid at the feet
of a newly self-assured Germany. A smoking gun in the critics' case against
Germany is the Demokratieprin , or prinafple of democracy, that is enshrined
in Germany's Basic Law. This principle of German constitutional law has
been at the center of a series of decisions, issued by the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) over the last decade,
which have presented a profound barrier to European integration. On the
one hand, the Constitutional Court's rulings reveal that domestic tribunal's
continuing willingness to intervene in and superintend the measures neces-
sary for supranational integration. Summoned to that role by the domestic
Demokratieprin p, Germany's high court has not shied away from serving
as a master of European integration.7 On the other hand, the Court's sub-
stantive interpretation of the principle of democracy has come to consist
in a set of concrete limits on Germany's participation in further European
integration. In the Lisbon Treaty Case from 2009 giving force to the princi-
4. Maurice Duverger, Pas d'Europe sans l'Allegmagne, LE MONDE, Sept. 9, 1947, translated in III
DOCUMENTS ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 51 (Walter Lipgens & Wilfried Loth
eds., 1988).
5. See The Reluctant Hegemon, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2013, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579456-if-europes-economies-are-recover-germany-
must-start-lead-reluctant-hegemon; Simon Bulmer & William E. Paterson, Germany as the EUs Reluc-
tant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints, 20 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 1387 (2013); Andrei S.
Markovits et al., Germany: -legemonic Power and Economic Gain?, 3 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 698 (1996).
But see Daniela Schwarzer & Kai-Olaf Lang, The Myth of German Hegemony, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 2,
2012), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138162/daniela-schwarzer-and-kai-olaf-
lang/the-myth-of-german-hegemony ("Germany's position as the chief backer of the eurozone's
stabilization arrangements does not necessarily translate into political supremacy. And as the euro
crisis has escalated and Germany has lost political allies, it will now have to accept that the common
currency area will only partly conform to its vision.').
6. See, e.g., Jakob Augstein, Stubborn and Egotistical: Europe Is Right to Doubt German Euro IDadershp,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/opinion-ger
man-euro-leadership-stubborn-and-egotistical-a-890848.html; Stuart Jeffries, Is Germany Too PowerfKl
for Europe?, GUARDIAN, Mar. 31, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/
31 /is-germany-too-powerful-for-europe.
7. See, e.g., Mattias Kumm, Who is the FinalArbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Concepts of the
Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court ofJusde, 36 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 351 (1999).
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ple of democracy, the Court said definitively: "this much Europe and no
more."
All of this justly leads to the inference, blared in an American headline,
that the German Constitutional Court judges - as they interpret and en-
force the constitutional principle of democracy - "hold Europe's fate in
their hands."9 The future of the centuries-old dream of a united Europe
now must travel a road that passes through the German Constitutional
Court as it applies the German constitution's principle of democracy.
This Article introduces the Demokratieprin!b. In Part II, I begin by more
fully documenting the Euro-skeptical turn in Germany's relationship with
Europe, paying particular attention to the central role played by the Con-
stitutional Court's interpretation of the Demokratiepring&. Part III, in four
subparts, provides a doctrinal introduction to the principle of democracy.
First, I map the principle's bases in the text of the German Grundgeset.
(Basic Law or Constitution). Second, I present the gloss the Constitutional
Court has given the principle, making special reference to the Court's re-
cent decisions involving challenges to Germany's participation in measures
seeking to advance European integration. Third, I deepen our understand-
ing of the DemokratieprinjZi by considering the Court's vision of parliamen-
tary democracy, which has developed into a central component of the
broader Demokraiepin!Zip. Finally, I rebut claims that, for all its rhetorical
bombast and headline-grabbing dramatics, the Court's jurisprudence rely-
ing on the Demokratieprinjb as the basis for reluctance towards Europe has
not served as a practical barrier to further European integration. In Part
IV, I provide greater theoretical insight into the Court's interpretation of
the Demokratieprinzjp by demonstrating that it is a nearly complete realiza-
tion of Jirgen Habermas's theory of discursive democracy. This highlights
two important points. First, contrary to Habermas's supranational vision
for his discourse theory of politics, the Court insists that the principle of
democracy find its expression within the framework of the German state.
This might be the final attribute of the doctrine as it has been defined by
the Court. Second, to the extent that the Constitutional Court's interpreta-
tion of the principle of democracy now constitutes a barrier to European
integration, this involves an astounding, historic, and deeply German irony
because Habermas has been one of Germany's most determined and vi-
sionary advocates for European supranationalism.
8. See Lisbon Treaty Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
June 30, 2009, 123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 267,
2009, available at http://www.bundesverfassunggericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bveOO02
08.html. See also Cornelia Koch, 'Bis hierber solist du kommen and nicht weiter: The German Constitutional
Court and the Boundaries of the European Integration Process, in THE FUTURE OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL-
ISM: COMPARATIVE AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 197 (Gabrielle Applebv et al. eds.,
2012).
9. Henry Chu, German Judges May Hold Europe's Fate in Their Hands, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/1 1/world/la- fg-germany-court-20120911.
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I. GERMANY'S EURO-SKEPTICAL TURN AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DEMOKRATIEPRINZIP
Germany was a founding member of the European Community and,'0
working in conjunction with France, has long been regarded as an essential
and unwavering component in the engine at the core of European integra-
tion." Enjoying strong support from both sides of the political spectrum
in the early days of war-ravaged West Germany,12 European integration
was anticipated by the Basic Law, which declared in its preamble that the
German people were "[i]nspired by the determination to promote world
peace as an equal partner in a united Europe."' 3 It was accepted, both inside
and outside of Germany, that European integration was the surest way to
rehabilitate Germany and to reconcile the country with its neighbors after
three-quarters of a century of devastating conflict.14 Germany has since
been at the forefront of each of Europe's most significant developments,
including the Schengen Convention, 5 monetary union,16 and the transition
10. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
available at https://treates.un.org/doc/Publiation/UNTS/Volume%20298/v298.pdf. See MARK
GILBERT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A CONCISE HISTORY (2012); John R. Gillingham, The German
Problem and European Integration, in ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 55 (Des-
mond Dinan ed., 2006).
11. GAVIN HEWITT, THE LOST CONTINENT 14 (2013) ("The Union had been largely a French
and German dream, designed to ensure that war never again returned to the continent."). See Jeffrey
Vanke, Charles de Gaulle's Uncertain Idea of Europe, in ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 10, at 141.
12. This commitment within the center-right Christian Democratic Union runs from Konrad
Adenauer through Helmut Kohl to Angela Merkel. Carlo Schmid and Willy Brandt carried the Euro-
pean banner for the center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany. "For more than 40 years the
cornerstone of foreign policy of all relevant political parties in West Germany had been the unifica-
tion of Europe as a European Federal State." Joachim Wieland, Germany in the European Union - The
Maastricht Decision of the Bundeverfassungsgericht, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 259, 259 (1994). See DIMITRI AL-
MEIDA, THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON POLITICAL PARTIES: BEYOND THE PER-
MISSIVE CONSENSUS (2012); WOLFRAM KAISER, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF
EUROPEAN UNION (2007); Christoph Egle, The SPD's Preferences on European Integration: Always One
Step Behind, in SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 23 (Dionyssis G. Dimi-
trakopoulos ed., 2011).
13. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Get.), pmbl. (emphasis added), translated in Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany (Fed. Ministry of Justice & Consumer Prot., 2012), http://www.gesetze-im-int
ernet.de/englisch.gg/basic law for the federal republic-of germany.pdf. In its original (1949)
version, Article 24 of the German Basic Law granted the Federation the competence to transfer state
sovereignty to inter-state institutions. Id. art. 24, available at http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd.
html.
14. "Due to the division of Germany into two States and the traumatic experience of National
Socialism, there was no basis for strong national feelings among the Germans. Adenauer saw mem-
bership in the European Communities as a possibility to bring Germany back into the club of leading
Western States." Wieland, supra note 12, at 259-60.
15. See Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Govern-
ments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30
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from the European Communities to the European Union." German
scholars and politicians played a fundamental role in the debate leading to
the promulgation of a European Union Constitution.'" And it was under
Germany's rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union that
the failed constitutional project was revived and implemented anew as the
Lisbon Treaty.'9 The centrality of the "ever closer" European project for
post-war Germany was expressed in clarion terms - until recently shared
by nearly all German elites - by Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic's
long-serving, first post-war chancellor: "European unity ... is a necessity
for all of us. It is ... necessary for our security, for our freedom, for our
I.L.M. 84; Aleidus Woltjer, Schengen: The Wqy ofNo Return?, 2 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 256,
257 (1995) ("At the same time, and perhaps in a true European spirit aimed at bringing about closer
cooperation between Western European countries, the heads of government of France and Germany
agreed, in 1984, to start an inter-governmental initiative to abolish border controls between both
countries. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg ... soon joined this initiative. Without arous-
ing much public attention the five signed an agreement on 14 June 1985 in Schengen (Luxem-
bourg).'.
16. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU].
See KENNETH DYSON & KEVIN FEATHERSTONE, THE ROAD TO MAASTRICHT: NEGOTIATING
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (1999).
17. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty]. Germany
played a leading role in the negotiation and promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty, not the least during
Germany's turn in the European Council's rotating presidency in the first half of 2007. See, e.g., Dec-
laration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome (Mar. 25,
2007), available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article 6902_en.htm.
18. A European federal state was the undeniable ambition of the advocates for a European con-
stitution, an old dream that, as it gained significant new momentum with the establishment of the
European Union, prompted Federal Constitutional Court Justice Dieter Grimm to pose his famous
question, "Does Europe need a Constitution?" See Grimm, supra note 2. In a widely-discussed speech
delivered at Humboldt University in Berlin in May 2000, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
answered Justice Grimm's question with an authoritative "yes." After cataloguing the difficulties
confronting the project of European integration, Fischer explained that the only viable solution
would be "the transition from a union of states to full parliamentarisation as a European Federa-
tion ..... That remarkable future, Fischer admitted, "will have to be based on a constituent treaty"
that "constitutionally enshrines]" the principle of subsidiarity. Joschka Fischer, From Confederag to
Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration, Speech at Humboldt University, Berlin, (May
12, 2000), in WHAT KIND OF CONSTITUTION FOR WHAT KIND OF POLITY? RESPONSES TO
JOSCHKA FISCHER 25, 27 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2000). The German philosopher Jiirgen Ha-
bermas influentially argued that, more than a concrete constitution, Europe needed a formal constitu-
tional process as the way to nurture the constitutional prerequisite of a shared European civic identi-
ty. Jiirgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, 11 NEW LEFT REV. 5, 15-19 (Sept.-Oct. 2001)
(referring to what he calls a "catalytic constitution").
19. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 17. See also Finn Laursen, The Liebon Treaty. The Treaty-Making
Process, in THE MAKING OF THE EU'S LISBON TREATY: THE ROLE OF MEMBER STATES 17 (Finn
Laursen ed., 2012); Hans J. Lietzmann, A Symbolic Revocation of Symbolism. The German Path from the EU
Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty, in THE MAKING OF THE EU'S LISBON TREATY: THE ROLE OF MEM-
BER STATES, (Finn Laursen ed., 2012); Frank R. Pfetsch, Germany's Role with Regard to the Reform Process
of the EU, in THE MAKING OF THE EU'S LISBON TREATY: THE ROLE OF MEMBER STATES, (Finn
Laursen ed., 2012); DAVID PHINNEMORE, THE TREATY OF LISBON: ORIGINS AND NEGOTIATION
(2013).
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existence as a nation . . . ."20 In light of this historical commitment to Eu-
ropean integration, how is it that we've now arrived at the conflict suggest-
ed by the title of this Article: Germany vs. Europe? Polls indicate that Ger-
mans are losing faith in the European project.21 Some Euro-skeptical voic-
es can now be heard above the din of German politics' pro-European con-
sensus.22 The German popular press - even in more respectable quarters
than the incorrigible Bild-Zeitung tabloid23 - is riled with distrust for and
exhaustion with the process of European integration.24 Perhaps there is no
better expression of this new mood than Focus Maga in's cover from Feb-
ruary 2010, which blares "Traitors in the Euro-Family" alongside a photo
of the Greek Venus de Milo with an air-brushed arm extending her middle
finger towards the magazine's German readers?25
A central thread in this complex story - set aflame by the sovereign
debt and banking crises that have bedeviled Europe the last several
26years - involves, to an extraordinary degree, the German Federal Con-
20. KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION, KONRAD ADENAUER AND THE EUROPEAN INTE-
GRATION 12, available at http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/GBKatalogKA.pdf (quoting Konrad
Adenauer, Chancellor, Fed. Republic of Germany, Speech at the German Bundestag (Dec. 15, 1954)).
21. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, The New Sick Man of Europe: The European Union, (2013), available
at http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/13/the-new-sick-man-of-europe-the-european-union/
(showing a 5% decline in Germany from 2012 to 2013 in confidence in the European Union as an
economic project and an 8% decline from 2012 to 2013 in Germans who view the EU favorably). See
also Rainer Buergin, Most Germans Reject Ceding Sovereignty to EU, Stern Poll Shows, BLOOMBERG (July 4,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-04/most-germans-reject-ceding-sovereignty-to-
cu-stern-poll-shows.html.
22. See Silent No More: A New Poliical Party Is the First to Call Openly for Scrapping the Euro, ECONO-
MIST, March 21, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21574036-new-political
-party- first-call-openly-scrapping-euro-silent-no-more; What Is the Alternative? Europe Waits as Angela
Merkel Faces a NewAnti-establishment Party, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2013, available at http://www.econo
mist.com/news/europe/21578105-europe-waits-angela-merkel-faces-new-anti-establishment-party-
what-alternative.
23. See P. Ronzheimer, Wiegeht es den Griechen mit unseren Milliarden?, BILD, Aug. 25, 2010, available
at http://www.bild.de/politik/2010/pobtik/wie-geht-es-den-griechen-mit-unseren-milliarden-13735
554.bild.html; Verkauft doch eure Inseln, ihr Pleite-Griechen ... und die Akropolis gleich mit!, BILD, Oct. 27,
2010, available at http://www.bild.de/politk/wirtschaft/griechenland-krise/regierung-athen-sparen-v
erkauft-inseln-pleite-akropolis-11692338.bild.html; Franz Solms-Laubach, Wir Zablen and sie bepobeln
uns: Schmei/ft die Griechen endkich aus dem Euro!, BILD, Feb. 17, 2012, available at http://www.bild.de/poli
tik/ausland/griechenland-krise/schmeisst-die-griechen-endlich-aus-dem-euro-22678402.bild.html.
24. See Bruce Stokes, Threat to the EU: German Exceptionalism Poses a Challenge, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INT'L (May 14, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/pew-research-study-shows-europ
eans-are-divided-about-state-of-europe-a-899460.html; Florian Diekmann, Spar-Entscheidung in Athen:
Was fir Griechen und Deutsche auf dem Spielsteht, SPIEGEL ONLINE WIRTSCHAFT (July 17, 2013), http://
www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/abstimmung-ueber-sparpaket-in-athen-wichtige-fragen-und-
antworten-a-911436.html.
25. See Die Griechenland-Pleite, Focus MAGAZIN, Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://www.focus.de/
magazin/archiv/jahrgang2010/ausgabe_8/.
26. See generally HEWITT, supra note 11, at 13 ("By May 2010, Europe's leaders feared the euro-
zone might break-up."); MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA (2013);
DAVID MARSH, EUROPE'S DEADLOCK: How THE EURO CRISIS COULD BE SOLVED - AND WHY
IT WON'T HAPPEN 62-83 (2013) (documenting the slow emergence and evolution of the crisis over
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stitutional Court, which is based in the quiet, southwestern German city of
Karlsruhe. This explains why, in a 2012 interview, Christine Legarde -
the French Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) - declared: 'f I hear the word Karlsruhe one more time, I'm leaving the
,00.27room."2
The IMF - along with European states working both from within and
outside the EU - has been desperately trying to pull Europe back from
the brink of this existential calamity. The German Constitutional Court has
been a persistent irritant throughout those efforts. Madame Legarde, for
example, was reacting to a 2012 decision of the Constitutional Court in
which the Court refused to grant a temporary injunction that would have
blocked Germany's participation in the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). 28 She was exercised by the fact that this victory for the ESM -
and Europe - was tempered by the Constitutional Court's clearly stated
discomfort with the democratic implications of Germany's commitment to
the permanent bailout fund.29
This "yes . . . but" approach has characterized the Constitutional
Court's frequent forays into Germany's European integration.30 Repeated-
ly, the Court has allowed Germany to proceed with measures aimed at
deepening European integration while at the same time expressing concern
about the democratic qua parliamentary repercussions of Germany's deci-
sion to ratify them.3 ' The Court's vacillation is, in part, a consequence of
the first decade of the twenty-first century); DAVID MARSH, THE EURO: THE BATTLE FOR THE
NEW GLOBAL CURRENCY 11 (2011) (describing the high hopes for the Euro as it launched in 1999
and the currency's subsequent fall from grace after the 2008 global economic crisis: "the European
common currency has become a saga of Wagnerian intensity... ."). See also Timothy Garton Ash,
The Crisis of Europe: How the Union Came Together and Why It's Falling Apart, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct.
2012, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138010/timothy-garton-ash/the-crisis-of-eu
rope; Martin Feldstein, The Failure of the Euro: The Little Curreng That Couldn't, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 2012, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136752/martin-feldstein/the-failure-
of-the-euro; Hugo Dixon, Can Europe's Divided House Stand? Separating Fiscal and Monetay Union, FOR-
EIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2011, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136505/hugo-dix
on/can-europes-divided-house-stand; Henry Farrell & John Quiggin, How to Save the Euro - and the
EU: Reading Keynes in Brussels, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2011, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/67761 /henry-farrell-and-john-quiggin/how-to-save-the-euro-and-the-eu.
27. Kay-Alexander Scholz, Karlsruhe's Constitutional Monasteg: What Germany's Euro Bailout Ruling






28. See ESM Temporary Injunction Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] Sept. 12, 2012, 132 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVER-
FGE] 195, 2012, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvrl39012
en.html.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Karlsruhe Has Spoken: "Yes" to the Lisbon Treaty, but.. 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1023, 1023-33 (2006); Karsten Schneider, Yes, But. .. One More Thing: Karlsruhe's Ruling on the European
Stability Mechanism, 14 GER. L.J. 53 (2013), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?
pagelD= 11&artlD=1496.
31. See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 325-52 (3d ed. 2012).
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the Basic Law's conflicting commands for European integration, on one
hand, and the preservation of Germany's national constitutional identity,
on the other hand.32
The history of the Court's intervention reads like a Michelin travel
guide, with stops in Brussels, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Lisbon, and - with
the ESM Temporary Injunction Case from 2009 - Luxembourg.33 Over the
course of this European jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court has fo-
cused on reaffirming and reimagining the Basic Law's principle of democ-
racy as a foundation of the German constitutional order and, therefore, as
a limit on Germany's participation in European integration.34
Germany's principle of democracy, as interpreted and applied by the
Constitutional Court, has become one of the chief barriers to Germany's
essential participation in the European project. It should be noted that the
Court's intervention on these terms represents a distinct domestic re-
sponse to dogged concerns about the EU's "democratic deficit."35 This
broader, enduring critique of the European Union draws attention to the
fact that European integration has been driven by, and resulted in, less-
than-majoritarian processes and institutions.36 On the constitutional level,
32. GG, BGBl. I, pmbl., art. 23, art. 79(3) (Ger.). See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 31, at 302.
33. See Solange I Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May
29, 1974, 37 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271, 1974;
Solange II Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986, 73
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 339, 1986; Maastricht Treaty
Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155, 1993; Banana Market
Regulation Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 7, 2000,
102 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 147, 2000; Lisbon Trea-
ty Case, 123 BVERFGE 267; EFSF Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Sept. 7, 2011, 129 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE]
124, 2011; ESM Temporary Injunction Case, 132 BVERFGE 195.
34. Davor Jani6, Caveats From Karlsruhe and Berlin: Whither Democrag After Lisbon?, 16 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 337, 340 (2010) ("[A]1though the principle of democracy has almost always been an explicit
or implicit litmus test of the BVerfG, the significance of this principle reached its apex with the 1is-
sabon-Urteil. Unlike in its previous case law, the BVerfG unambiguously and conclusively refused to
endorse the European Parliament as a primary institution of E.U. democracy.').
35. The term "democratic deficit" is generally attributed to David Marquand, who served as a
member of the British Parliament and as an EC Commission official. DAVID MARQUAND, PARLIA-
MENT FOR EUROPE 64-66 (1979). See also Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European
Community Rulemaking: A Callfor Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 451 (1999);
Stephen C. Sieberson, The Treaty ofLisbon and Its Impact on the European Union's Democratic Deficit, 14
COLUM.J. EUR. L. 445 (2008).
36. See Francis Fukuyama, European Identities Part II, AM. INT. (Jan. 12, 2012), http://blogs.the-
american-interest.com/fukuyama/2012/01/12/european-identities-part-i/ ("And to be quite honest,
the whole European project has been an elite-driven affair.'); Jiirgen Habermas, Professor, Lecture in
Leuven, Belgium: Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis (Apr. 26, 2013), available at http://
www.kuleuven.be/communicatie/evenementen/evenementen/jurgen-habermas/en/democracy-soli
darity-and-the-european-crisis ("The European Union owes its existence to the efforts of political
elites who could count on the passive consent of their more or less indifferent populations as long as
the peoples could regard the Union as also being in their economic interests all things considered.").
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European elites and the European Council have pushed unification ahead
through incremental projects (such as monetary union and expansion) that
were meant to reaffirm the logic and boost the momentum of integration.
Neill Nugent has explained:
The integration process has been characterized by an
almost constant edging forward, with "advances" followed
by pressures for more advances. Phases and forms of inte-
gration have frequently followed almost inevitably and log-
ically from earlier - and often less significant - phases
and forms. In a pattern well understood by those who are
persuaded by historical institutionalist interpretations of
the evolution of the integration process . . ., and especially
by the importance of "path dependence" in shaping the
nature of the evolution, the treaty architects have, as Wes-
sels ... has shown, developed an almost ideal three-step
type of integration cascade. In the first phase, govern-
ments realize the advantages of cooperating with other EU
countries in a particular policy area and attempt to do so
on a very loose intergovernmental basis, often on the mar-
gins of, or even outside, the EU framework. When this
form of cooperation proves to be insufficient, the gov-
ernments move to the second phase, which sees the policy
area given clear treaty recognition and moved firmly into
the organizational framework of the Union, but still on an
essentially intergovernmental basis in that the role of the
Commission is limited, the EP is at best given only consul-
tative rights, Council decision are by unanimity, and the
Court has few - if any - powers. In the third phase,
governments realize they must permit stronger decision-
making processes if aims are to be achieved, so the supra-
national route is taken with more effective powers and
roles assigned to the Commission, EP and Court and,
most importantly, QMV permitted in the Council. ... It is
unlikely in the foreseeable future that [the treaties] will be
changed in the manner that was attempted by the Consti-
tutional Treaty process. In all there will be a turning away
from the grandiose and highly symbolized approach of the
CT and a return to steady and understated incremental-
ism. 
37
37. NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 136, 146
(6th ed. 2006). See Geoffrey Edwards, Common Foreign and Security Polig: Incrementalism in Action?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 1998).
Jiirgen Habermas acknowledged the elite character of the European project, complaining that
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At the regulatory level, domestic executive power (exercised at the Eu-
ropean level by the Member States' representatives to the Council of the
European Union), aided by the European Commission's technocracy,
promulgates a large percentage of all law spanning across Europe.3 8 This
European governing reality has been advanced by the Court of Justice of
the European Union, which has aggrandized itself and asserted the su-
premacy of European law over domestic law. Sadly, a directly-elected but
weak European Parliament has little authority to check these forces and
burnish Europe's democratic legitimacy. Two responses to the growing
problem of Europe's democratic deficit have emerged. First, there has
been a push for more democracy at the European level, including a more
powerful and relevant European Parliament, as well as experimental
measures of direct democracy. 39 Second, there is recognition that Member
States' democratically legitimate national parliaments must have a greater
role in European affairs. 40 The Constitutional Court's recent reinforcement
the "Union's constitution is the work of political elites." HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 78 (Russell
Miller trans.). See also Alan Cowell, A Challenge to European Political Elite, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2013,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/world/europe/a-challenge-to-european-political-c
lite.html; Judy Dempsey, E. U. Elites Keep Power from the People, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/world/europe/23iht-letter23.html; MAX HALLER, EUROPE-
AN INTEGRATION AS AN ELITE PROCESS: THE FAILURE OF A DREAM? (2008).
38. Some put the percentage as high as 80%. See, e.g., Roman Herzog & Lilder Gerken, The Spirit
of the Time: Revise the European Constitution to Protect National Parliamentary Denocrag, 3 EUR. CONST. L.
REV. 209, 210 (2007). But this is often based on Jacques Delors' dramatic prediction from 1988. See
Remarks of Mr. Jacques Delors, EUR. PARL. DEB. (2-367) 140 (July 6, 1988). This claim, although
often repeated, is now disputed. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Myth of Europe's 'Democratic Deficit," 43
INTERECONOMICs 331, 332 (2008) ("In 1988, Jacques Delors famously predicted that 'in 10 years. . .
80 percent of economic, and perhaps social and fiscal policy-making' would be of EU origin. Today
Delors' statement is often misquoted as a 'factoid' in public discussion: one often hears that 80 per
cent [sic] of allEuropean policy-making on every issue already comes from Brussels."). See also Vaughne
Miller, How Much Legislation Comes from Europe? 1 (House of Commons Library, Res. Paper No. 10/62,
2010), available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP10-62.pdf ("Using statistics from national
law databases and the EU's EUR-Lex database, it is possible to estimate the proportion of national
laws based on EU laws. In the UK data from these sources provided estimates that suggest that over
the twelve-year period from 1997 to 2009 6.8% of primary legislation (Statutes) and 14.1% of sec-
ondary legislation (Statutory Instruments) had a role in implementing EU obligations, although the
degree of involvement varied from passing reference to explicit implementation.... The British
Government estimates that around 50% of UK legislation with a significant economic impact origi-
nates from EU legislation. Estimates of the proportion of national laws based on EU laws vary wide-
ly in other EU Member States, ranging from 6 .3 % to 8 4 %. However, there is no totally accurate,
rational or useful way of calculating the percentage of national laws based on or influenced by the
EU.").
39. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 17, art. 1(12) (amending TEU articles 8A(1)-(2), 8B(1)-(3), and
8B(4), inter alia, regarding democratic principles). See also JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY:
A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 114-121, 133 (2010); JEAN BLONDEL, RICHARD SINNOrT &
PALLE SVENSSON, PEOPLE AND PARLIAMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: PARTICIPATION, DE-
MOCRACY, AND LEGITIMACY (1998); Sieberson, supra note 35, at 452-54, 463.
40. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 17, art. 1(12) (amending TEU article 8C, inter aha, regarding the
role of National Parliaments in the European Union). See also Ian Cooper, A 'Virtual Third Chamber'
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of the German principle of democracy in its European jurisprudence is a
decided endorsement of the latter and, in itself, represents a challenge to
the power and autonomy of supranational European institutions to resolve
Europe's democratic deficit.41
But what is the principle of democracy? What is the Constitutional
Court's vision and theory of democratic legitimacy as it operates as part of
Germany's constitutional identity and, therefore, as a limit on Germany's
participation in the European project?
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY IN
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Textual Basis
The principle of democracy is derived from provisions that are not lo-
cated in the Basic Law's first section, labeled "Basic Rights" (Grundrechte)
and spanning the constitution's first nineteen articles.42 This "bill of rights"
is where one finds the traditional subjective, negative rights - seasoned
with a sprinkling of positive rights - securing liberalism's political and
economic freedom.43 Instead, the principle of democracy is grounded in
Article 20(1) and (2) of the Basic Law, provisions that identify Germany as
a "democratic and social federal state" and, at the same time, make the
exercise of state authority a matter of Germans' electoral expression.4 4 Ar-
ticle 38 of the Basic Law completes the content of Article 20 by channel-
ing Germans' franchise into the "general, direct, free, equal, and secret"
election of representatives to the Bundestag (Federal Parliament).45 Signifi-
cantly, Article 20 is part of Germany's constitutional identity secured for
eternity - even against constitutional amendment - by Article 79(3) of
the Basic Law. All of this, especially in the light of the Basic Law's self-
for the European Union? National Parliaments after the Treay of Lisbon, 35 W. EUR. POL. 441 (2012); Tapio
Raunio, National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and Agenda for Future Research, 15 J.
LEGIS. STUD. 317 (2009); Philipp Kiiver, The Treay of Lisbon, The Naional Parliaments and the Printiple of
Subsidiarity, 15 MAASTRICHTJ. EUR. & COMP. L. 77 (2008); PIRIs, supra note 39, at 122-133; Sieber-
son, supra note 35, at 462.
41. See Jandi6, supra note 34.
42. GG, BGBI. I, arts. 1-19 (Get.).
43. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 31, at 59-62.
44. GG, BGBI. I, art. 20 (Get.). See Bodo Pieroth, Art. 20: Demokraieprin:6b und Republik, in
GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: KOMMENTAR 479 (Hans D. Jarass &
Bodo Pieroth eds., 10th ed. 2009); Horst Dreier, Artikel 20 - Demokraie, in II GRUNDGESETZ
KOMMENTAR 20 (Horst Dreier ed., 1998).
45. GG, BGBI. I, art. 38 (Get.). See Bodo Pieroth, Art. 38: WahhlechtsgrundsdtZe und Rechtsstellung der
Abgeordneten, in GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: KOMMENTAR, at 670
(Hans D. Jarass & Bodo Pieroth eds., 10th ed. 2009); Martin Morlok, Arikel38 - Wahlrechtsgrundsat-
.e/Abgeordnete, in II GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR (Horst Dreier ed., 1998).
46. GG, BGBI. I, art. 79(3) (Ger.). See Bodo Pieroth, Art. 79: Anderung des GrundgesetZes, in
GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: KOMMENTAR, at 843 (Hans D. Jarass
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conscious renunciation of the Nazi tyranny and counterpoise to the social-
ist experiment that was unfolding just across the Wall, makes the principle
of democracy "the very heart of the constitutional system."47 This helps
explain why, when considering the transfer of sovereign state authority to
the democratically deficient European Union that is at stake in each addi-
tional step towards Europe's integration, the Constitutional Court has tak-
en refuge in this jurisprudence. For example, in the ESM Temporary Injunc-
tion Case from 2012, the Court brushed aside the complainants' creative
assertion of basic rights (such as the right to property) and focused again
on the principle of democracy.48 In refusing to grant a temporary injunc-
tion blocking Germany's participation in the permanent bailout mecha-
nism, the Court concluded that "the European Stability Mechanism essen-
tially takes account of the requirements of Article 38 (1), Article 20 (1) and
(2) in conjunction with Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law." 49
B. Recent European Jurisprudence
The Constitutional Court has built a complex framework upon the
principle's textual foundation. Its recent European cases are representative
of this jurisprudence. For example, in rejecting the application for a tem-
porary injunction in the 2012 ESM Temporary Injunction Case, the Court re-
affirmed its well-settled rule that the right to elect members of the Bundes-
tag guarantees citizens self-determination as well as free and equal partici-
pation in the state authority exercised by Germany.50 It follows from this,
the Court explained, that transfers of essential public competencies from
the Bundestag to European institutions - budgetary decisions in the ESM
Temporary Injunction Case - could be incompatible with the structural prin-
ciples of the Basic Law, especially the principle of democracy.5 1 In the con-
& Bodo Pieroth eds., 10th ed. 2009); Horst Dreier, Artikel 79 III- Anderung des Grandgesetes, in II
GRUNDGESTEz KOMMENTAR, at 1503 (Horst Dreier ed., 1998).
47. Eckart Klein & Thomas Giegerich, The Parliamentay Democray, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 141, 152 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988).
48. Some of the complainants joined for hearing by the Court in the ESM Temporag Injunction
Case asserted a violation of the Basic Law's property-rights protections (Article 14) on the basis that
Germany's participation in the ESM would contribute to an inflationary policy that would degrade
Germans' wealth. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether this claim justified a temporary
injunction blocking Germany's participation in the ESM because "negative consequences for mone-
tary stability" may constitute a constitutional violation "at most in cases of a clear reduction of mone-
tary value." The Court found that the complainants had not submitted sufficient facts to justify a
review of this issue. ESM Temporary Injunction Case, 132 BVERFGE 195 (% 146, 200) (citing EFSF




51. Id. % 209, 212.
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text of Germany's significant bailout commitments under the ESM,5 2 the
Court noted that the principle of democracy prevents the Bundestag from
giving European institutions "blanket" or "dynamic" grants of authority
without safeguards that ensure the continuing, effective exercise of Ger-
man state power that has been democratically legitimated by the parlia-
ment in keeping with Articles 20 and 38 of the Basic Law. 53 A violation of
the principle of democracy would result, the Court explained, if the Bundes-
tag relinquished its parliamentary budgetary responsibility so that it (or fu-
ture parliaments) could no longer determine the budget "on its own re-
sponsibility." 54 The Court also emphasized that the principle of democracy
requires that the Bundestag be fully informed5 about Germany's budgetary
commitments so that it can effectively remain the permanent master of
this core piece of public authority. 6 In its summary review of Germany's
commitment to the ESM, the Court found that these parliamentary pre-
rogatives had not "completely failed" and, for that reason, the merits chal-
lenges to the ESM had such minimal chances of success that a temporary
injunction blocking Germany's participation in the ESM was not justi-
fied.
There was little that was new in the 2012 ESM Temporary Injunction Case.
The Court pressed an identical line of reasoning a year earlier in its ruling
on a challenge to Germany's participation in the European Financial Sta-
52. Germany's commitment to the ESM consisted in nearly C22 billion to be paid into the capital
of the ESM with an additional callable contribution to the ESM's capital of nearly (170 billion. ESM-
Finanzierungsgesetz [ESMFinG] [ESM Financing Act], Sept. 13, 2012, BGBl. I at 1918 (Get.), availa-
ble at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/esmfing/gesamt.pdf. See ESM Temporary
Injunction Case, 132 BVERFGE 195 (1 113) (Get.). The total risk to which Germany is exposed
pursuant to its ESM commitments (nearly C192 billion) would equal nearly half the country's annual
budget. See BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN, BUNDESHAUSHALT 2013, available at http://
www.bundeshaushalt-info.de/startseite/#/2013/soll/ausgaben/einzelplan.html. Otherwise, Germa-
ny's largest budget commitment is the Federal Ministry for Work and Social Welfare, which, at nearly
E120 billion, constitutes almost 40% of the budget. Id. While it is very unlikely that Germany would
have to meet the full amount of its callable commitment to the ESM in a single budget cycle, the
press has reported that the C4 billion call from the ESM it will answer in 2014 (a sum larger than the
2013 budget lines for the Foreign Ministry and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety) will prevent Germany from achieving a balanced budget this year.
James Angelos, Germany Settles on Budget, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424127887324077704578358181614522580.html. Germany's contribution to
the ESM is roughly 27.1%. Key Euro-Zone Country Contribution to the Eumpean Stability Mechanism (ESM),
STATISTA, 2011, http://www.statista.com/statistics/201810/european-stability-mechanism-contribut
ion-of-eu-countries/.
53. ESM Temporary Injunction Case, 132 BVERFGE 195 (1209).
54. Id. 1210.
55. Id. 1 215 (citing GG, BGBI. I, arts. 43(1) & 44).
56. Id 1215 (citing EFSF Case, 129 BVERFGE 124 (179-80)).
57. Id 271. Elsewhere the Court described the relevant standard as an "impairment," id T 274,
and an "adverse effect." Id. 1 315. The clearest statement of the relevant standard is that the surren-
der of national, parliamentary budgetary autonomy must consist in a "manifest overstepping of ex-
treme limits" or that "at least for an appreciable period of time, [budgetary autonomy] was not mere-
ly restricted but effectively failed." Id. 216 (citing EFSF Case, 129 BVERFGE 124 (183)).
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bility Facility (EFSF), the provisional bailout program for Greece that pre-
ceded the permanent ESM. In the 2011 EFSF Case, the Constitutional
Court also insisted that core governing competencies - such as budgeting
for public expenditures - are the absolute prerogative of the Bundestag
because only the democratically elected parliament can legitimate those
decisions.5 8 The Bundestag serves this role in two ways, the Court explained.
First, it is the only public institution that enjoys a direct electoral, repre-
sentative nexus with the people. 9 Second, the Bundestag is privileged with
respect to the exercise of these powers as a result of its uniquely delibera-
tive processes. The Court referred to parliament's deliberative processes as
"conceptual political decisions ... regarded as general debate on policy."60
In the EFSF Case, the Constitutional Court found no constitutional viola-
tion in Germany's role in the provisional bailout for Greece, but it force-
fully noted the limits on Germany's further participation in European inte-
gration arising from the principle of democracy. The Court explained that
the principle of democracy unalterably requires Bundestag approval of
budgetary commitments, even in the framework of Germany's European
obligations.61 In particular, the Court insisted that Germany's participation
in the bailout could not involve automatic or irreversible budget decisions
taken at the supranational level, where they lie beyond the reach of parlia-
ment. "Every individual disposal [of public revenue]," the Court explained,
"requires the consent of the Bundestag."62 Moreover, it is from the Bundes-
tag - and the parliaments of the other Member States - that European
initiatives derive "direct democratic legitimation."63
The ESM Temporary Injunction Case and EFSF Case build on the Consti-
tutional Court's seminal Lisbon Treaty Case from 2009,64 in which the prin-
ciple of democracy also played a fundamental role. In that decision, the
58. EFSF Case, 129 BVERFGE 124 (179-80).
59. Id. at 168-69.
60. Id. at 178 (citing Lisbon Treaty Case, 123 BVERFGE 267 (411)).
61. Id. at 178 ("As representatives of the people, the elected Members of the German Bundestag
must retain control of fundamental budgetary decisions even in a system of intergovernmental ad-
ministration.").
62. Id. at 180-81.
63. Id. at 181.
64. Lisbon Treaty Case, 123 BVERFGE 267. See Special Section: The Federal Constitutional Court's Lis-
bon Case, 10 GER. L.J. 1201-1308 (2009); Dieter Grimm, Das Grundgesetq als Riegel vor einer Verstaat-
lichung der Europdischen Union - Zum Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesvefassungsgerichts, 48 DER STAAT 475
(2009); Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, Identily Trumps Integration: The Lisbon Treaty in the German Federal
Constitutional Court, 48 DER STAAT 517 (2009); Christoph Schonberger, Die Europairche Union rziscben
"Demokratiedefizjt" und Bundesstaatsverbot- Anmerkungen Zum Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgeichts,
48 DER STAAT 535 (2009); DER VERTRAG VON LISSABON VOR DEM BUNDESVERFAS-
SUNGSGERICHT (Karen Kaiser ed., 2013); The German Constitutional Court's Lisbon Ruling: JIgal and
Poliical-Science Perspecives (Andreas Fischer-Lescano et al. eds., Ctr. of European Law & Politics,
ZERP Discussion Paper 1/2010, 2010), available at http://www.mpifg.de/people/mh/pap
er/ZERP%20Discussion%2OPaper/201.2010.pdf.
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Court considered challenges to Germany's ratification of the Lisbon Trea-
ty, which sought to implement much of the significant structural reform of
the European Union that the failed European Constitution would have
achieved. The integration implicated by the ESM and EFSF, although by
no means trivial, was nevertheless discretely concerned with supranational
transfers of Germany's budgetary authority. The Lisbon Treaty, to the
contrary, involved integration's "big bang,"6 5 including the dissolution of
the European Union's pillar structure,66 conferring the European Union
with autonomous legal personality,67 making the Charter of Fundamental
Rights binding,68 further developing the European Parliament's law-
making authority,69 establishing the President of the European Council and
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, 70 and expanding and cataloguing the European Union's competen-
cies. If the Court was moved to worry about the principle of democracy in
the narrower context of Euro-zone bailouts, it. should not be surprising
that it expressed apprehension about the Bundestag's integrity and policy-
making prerogative in the context of the far-reaching transfers of German
sovereign authority implicated by the Lisbon Treaty.
Again, the Court resorted to its "yes ... but" formula. Yes, German rati-
fication of the Lisbon Treaty could proceed within the framework of the
Basic Law. But only after the enacting legislation that accompanied ratifica-
tion had been amended to ensure the Bundestag's prerogative over the exer-
cise of the core competencies of state authority. The principle of democra-
cy, alongside other parts of the constitutional identity framed by the Basic
Law, served as one of the chief bases for the Court's reservations about
further integration. The Court made the Bundestag the centerpiece of that
constitutional commitment. The right to vote for members of the Bundes-
tag, the Court explained, establishes democratic self-determination through
free and equal participation in the state authority exercised by Germany.
In turn, the popular sovereignty secured by this guarantee is to be ex-
pressed through the right to elect members of the Bundestag, through which
the people exercise their political will. 72 "The election of the members of
the German Bundestag," said the Court, "is the source of state authority."
73
The Court's recognition of the "major importance" of the election of
65. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 17, art. 1(22) (introducing a new Article 10 providing "enhanced
cooperation" with the expectation that enhanced cooperation will further the objectives of the Un-
ion, protect its interests, and reinforce its integration process).
66. Id. art. 1(2)(b) (amending art. 1(3)).
67. Id. art. 1(55) (introducing new art. 46A).
68. Id. art. 1(8) (introducing new art. 6(1)).
69. Id. art. 1(15-16) (introducing new art. 9A-9B).
70. Id. arts. 1(16), (19) (introducing new arts. 9B and 9E).




members of the parliament for the principle of democracy was reinforced
by its conclusion that the franchise has significance for fundamental, basic
individual rights, including personal freedom and human dignity.7 4
Straying into the realm of political philosophy, the Court found confir-
mation for these conclusions in general democratic theory. "In modern
territorial states," the Court explained, "the self-determination of the peo-
ple is mainly realized in the election of bodies of a union of rule, which
exercise public authority . .. either in a single parliamentary representative
body ... or in a presidential system."7 s Citing its 1956 decision in which it
imposed a ban on the German Communist Party, the Court recalled that
the exclusion of the Communist Party from political life - especially par-
liamentary politics - was necessary because the threat the party posed to
the "free democratic basic order" would have corrupted "the procedurally
regulated battle for political power that is waged to gain the majority" in
parliament.7 6 As it would do again in the EFSF Case, the Court also made
general claims in the Lisbon Treat Case about the democratic merits of the
parliamentary prerogative it was articulating on the basis of parliaments'
reliance on public discourse - in the "party political and parliamentary
sphere" - for the development of public policy.7 7
The Court forcefully asserted that these principles - free and equal
parliamentary elections serving as the basis for state power and constitut-
ing a significant component of human dignity - are elements of the eter-
nal and unamendable constitutional identity secured by Article 79(3) of the
Basic Law.7 8 "The principle of democracy," the Court insisted, "may not
be balanced against other legal interests; it is inviolable." 7 9 And it is the
preservation of this constitutional identity - consisting, to a significant
degree, in the principle of democracy - that animates the Court's insist-
ence on a clear outer limit to German participation in European integra-
tion. Of great relevance for the subsequent Euro-crisis cases, the Court in
the Lisbon Treao Case identified revenue-raising and budgetary authority
amongst a catalogue of core competencies of state authority over which
parliament "must retain sufficiently substantial responsibilities and compe-
tencies of its own" in order to realize the Basic Law's commitment to the
principle of democracy.8 0 This is the basis for the Court's insistence in the
ESM Temporary Injuncion Case and EFSF Case that the Bundestag must re-
74. Id. at 340-41.
75. Id. at 366-67.
76. Id. at 367 (citing Communist Party Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Consti-
tutional Court] Aug. 17, 1956, 5 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVER-
FGE] 85 (198)).
77. Lisbon Treaty Case, 123 BVERFGE 267 (358).
78. Id. at 344.
79. Id. at 343.
80. Id. at 370.
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main the "permanent master" of Germany's sovereign budgetary compe-
tence. Several of the other non-transferable core competencies identified
by the Court in the Lisbon Treaty Case also have a unique nexus with par-
liament, including the state's monopoly on the use of military force over
which, in the German constitutional scheme, the Bundestag exercises exclu-
sive control.81 The Court - and German political actors - regularly refer
to the Bundeswehr (German Federal Armed Forces) as a Parlamentarmee
82(parliamentary army). Drawing on that terminology, the logic of the
Court's reasoning in the Lisbon Treaty Case, the EFSF Case, and the ESM
Temporary Injunction Case suggests that we might refer to Germany's authori-
ty to tax and spend as a Parlamentsbudget (parliamentary budget). In this
way, the Court creates a virtuous circle that reaffirms the parliamentary
quintessence of the principle of democracy: the people are the authors of
state authority through their right to vote for the Bundestag, and the demo-
cratically elected Bundestag must remain the master of the core expressions
of state authority. "The election of the members of the German Bundestag
by the people," the Court urged, "fulfills a central role in the system ...
[and] the German Bundestag must retain a formative influence on political
developments in Germany."83
The principle of democracy, as interpreted and enforced by the Court in
these recent European cases, marks a strict outer limit to Germany's inte-
gration into the European Union. It is part of Germany's inviolable and
unalterable constitutional identity. And the principle of democracy, it
seems, is chiefly a commitment to parliamentary governance.
C The Prindple of Democrag as Parliamentary Democrag
To say that the principle of democracy is realized in elections for the
members of the Bundestag merely begs the question: what vision of democ-
racy has the Court sought to advance with respect to the power and func-
tion of the Bundestag? What is the Court's vision of parliamentary democra-
cy? Answering this question requires consideration of the Court's jurispru-
dence in a broad range of topics, including executive-legislative checks and
balances; the rights and duties of the majority and opposition in parlia-
ment; the nature and function of Germany's electoral system; the political
role and sources of funding for political parties; and Germany's illiberal
81. Id. at 360-61 (citing AWACS I Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] July 12, 1994, 90 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVER-
FGE] 286 (382)).
82. Id. See also Russell A. Miller, Germany's Basic Law and the Use of Force, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LE-
GAL STUD. 197, 204 (2010); Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, Germany's Foreign and Security
Policy in the Face of Global Challenges, 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy (Feb. 4, 2006)
(transcript available at http://www.european-security.com/nindex.php?id=5509).
83. Lisbon Treaty Case, 123 BVERFGE 267 (356).
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"militant democracy." 84 I will not tell that full, complex story here, alt-
hough I want to acknowledge that it is a subject made all the more re-
markable by Germany's troubled democratic heritage.85 A more complete
version of that jurisprudence has been presented elsewhere. But in sum-
marizing the field, I can highlight two contrasting themes. On one hand,
the Court has sought to ensure broad, diverse, and plural representation in
the Bundestag through political parties that enjoy quasi-public status and a
near monopoly on what the Court has called popular or political "will
formation." In this vein the Court has vigilantly nurtured lively political
debate in the Bundestag by shielding minority and unconventional parties
against legislation or practices that would have chilled or inhibited their
role, particularly with regard to participation in parliamentary activities,8 7
party financing, and requirements for gaining access to the ballot.8 9 On
84. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 31, at 216-301.
85. See GERT-JOACHIM GLAESSNER, GERMAN DEMOCRACY: FROM POST-WORLD WAR II TO
THE PRESENT DAY (2005); ROBERT ROHRSCHNEIDER, LEARNING DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRATIC
AND ECONOMIC VALUES IN UNIFIED GERMANY (1999); HANS MOMMSEN, THE RISE AND FALL
OF WEIMAR DEMOCRACY (Elborg Forster & Larry Eugene Jones trans., 1996).
86. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 31, at 216-301; Donald P. Kommers, The Federal Consd-
tutional Court: Guardian of German Democray, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 111 (2006);
DAVID P. CONRADT & ERIC LANGENBACHER, THE GERMAN POLITY (10th ed. 2013); Michael
Bernhard, Democrati.Zation in Germany: A Reappraisal, 33 COMP. POL. 379 (2001); ARMIN
GRONBACHER, THE MAKING OF GERMAN DEMOCRACY: WEST GERMANY IN THE ADENAUER
ERA, 1945-65 (2010); GLAESSNER, supra note 85.
87. See Schleswig-Holstein Investigative Committee Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 2, 1978, 49 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFAS-
SUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 70; Green Party Exclusion Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 14, 1986, 70 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFAS-
SUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 324; Minority Rights in Investigative Committees Case, Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] April 8, 2002, 105 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 197.
88. See Party Finance II Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
July 19, 1966, 20 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 56; Party
Finance III Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 3, 1968,
24 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 300; Party Finance VI
Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 26, 1991, 85
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVEREGE] 264. See also MICHAEL Ko8,
THE POLITICS OF PARTY FUNDING: STATE FUNDING TO POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY COM-
PETITION IN WESTERN EUROPE (2010); Thomas Gede, Comparative Study of U.S. and West German
Political Finance Regulation: The Question of Contribution Controls, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 543
(1980-1981).
89. See Ballot Admission Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Aug. 1, 1953, 3 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 19;
Stovesandt Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 15, 1960,
12 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 10; Independent Workers
Party Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 21, 1993, 89
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 266. See also JOACHIM
LEGE, UNTERSCHRIFTENQUOREN ZWISCHEN PARTEIENSTAAT UND SELBSTVERWALTUNG (1996);
UWE W. KITZINGER, GERMAN ELECTORAL POLITICS: A STUDY OF THE 1957 CAMPAIGN 206-07,
209-10 (1960) (explaining party fundraising activities and the issue of tax-exemption as it relates to
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the other hand, the Constitutional Court enforces a limited set of illiberal
provisions meant to protect German democracy from its past failures. This
means that the Court has upheld the statutorily imposed requirement that
a party achieve a five percent threshold of electoral success before it can
enter parliament. 90 And, as suggested above by reference to the Communist
Pary Case, in extremely rare instances the Court has banned political par-
ties that sought to "undermine or abolish the free democratic basic or-
der."91 The German past is poignantly present in both of these jurispru-
dential currents.
Beyond this summary, I want to highlight one recent case because it re-
veals a very distinctive feature of the Constitutional Court's understanding
of the principle of democracy as it is embodied by the Bundestag. I have in
mind the Court's HartZ IV Case from 2010.9 The term "Hartz Four" re-
fers to the extensive and controversial reform of the German social wel-
fare system proposed by a commission led by former Volkswagen execu-
tive Peter Hartz and implemented as law by Chancellor Gerhard Schro-
der's center-left coalition in 2002. The Hartz IV reform still inflames pas-
sions. Some credit the policy for reviving Germany's now-sizzling export
economy and helping secure the country's budgetary soundness.9 4 Others
party elections of the Bundestag).
90. See Bavarian Party Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Jan. 23, 1957, 6 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 84; Danish
Minority Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 11, 1954, 4
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 31. But see National Unity
Election Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 29, 1990, 82
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 322.
91. See Socialist Reich Party Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Oct. 23, 1952, 2 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1;
Communist Party Case, 5 BVERFGE 85. But see NPD Party Ban Dismissal Case, Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] March 18, 2003, 107 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 339.
92. The "malfunction of parliament" is seen as one of the main explanations for Hider's rise to
power. As Klein and Giegerich explain, "the executive could rather seldom rely on a stable majority
in the Diet, multiparty coalitions followed one another in rapid sequence, and soon a 'negative' ma-
jority of extreme left wing and right wing parties united for destroying the constitutional system."
Klein & Giegerich, supra note 47, at 143. In explaining the democratic failures that enabled Hitler's
rise to power, these authors also note that a "lack of democratic consciousness, widespread among
the population, was also apparent among its representatives." Id. Klein and Giegerich link these phe-
nomena to the development of Germany's post-war democracy. "After World War II," they explain,
"a new and more successful attempt was made to reconstruct a German state on the basis of democ-
racy." Id.
93. Hartz IV Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 9,
2010, 125 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 175. See Claudia
Bittner, Casenote - Human Dignity as a Matter of Legislative Consisteng in an Ideal World: The Fundamental
Right to Guarantee a Subsistence Minimum in the German Federal Constitutional Court's Judgment of 9 Februag
2010, 12 GER. L.J. 1941 (2011); Stefanie Egidy, Casenote - The Fundamental R/ght to the Guarantee of a
Subsistence Minimum in the HartZ IV Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 12 GER. L.J. 1961
(2011).
94. See, e.g., Guido Bohsem, Zehn Jahre nach Schroders Reform: Warum Harty IV gelungen ist, SOD-
DEUTSCHE (Aug. 14, 2012, 10:33 AM), http://www.sueddeutsche.dc/wirtschaft/zehn-jahre-na
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decry the program as a neo-liberal assault on Germany's cherished social
solidarity, epitomized by its longstanding commitment to a social market
economy.95 In practical terms, one part of the reform merged welfare and
unemployment benefits, leaving recipients with considerably less govern-
ment support than they enjoyed under the previous regime. The reduction
in benefits was challenged before the Constitutional Court as a violation of
the state's obligation, under Articles 1 and 20 of the Basic law, to "guaran-
tee a subsistence minimum" of support for the disadvantaged in German
society.96 The Court sided with the complainants and found that the Hartz
IV reform violated this guarantee.97
This case is discussed here to draw attention to the reasoning the Court
employed in reaching its decision. The Court did not conclude that the real
amount of support provided by the Hartz IV law (roughly (350/month)
fell short of the constitutional guarantee as a substantive matter. That is,
the Court did not identify a fixed sum that would be necessary to fulfill the
constitutional right to a subsistence minimum. Instead, the Court objected
to the unsystematic, inconsistent, and irrational method the Bundestag used
in settling on the amount of support to be paid. No matter how much
support the parliament chooses to provide - even if it were less than the
figure originally legislated - the Court insisted that the Bundestag must
employ a rational and consistent calculation procedure that ensures that
the parliament has "completely and correctly ascertained the necessary
facts and ... kept within the bounds of what is justifiable in all calculation
steps with a comprehensible set of figures within this selected procedure
and its structural principles."9
ch-schroeders-reform-warum-hartz-iv-gelungen-ist-1.1440740; Lisa Nienhaus, Der HartZ-Erfolg: Zehn
Jabre sind die Arbeitsmarktreformen alt. Nie waren ne beliebt. Aber sie wirken, Fagit- Das Wirschaftsblog,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, (Mar. 15, 2013, 4:22 PM), http://blogs.faz.net/fazit/20
13/03/15/der-hartz-erfolg-1 190/; Judy Dempsey, German Unemployment Down for 12/h Straight Month,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/business/global/Oleu
econ.html.
95. See, e.g., Peter Bofinger, Die Mythen um Hart IV, TAZ.DE (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.taz.de/!112801/; THOMAS MAHLER, IN DER SCHLANGE: MEIN JAHR AUF HARTZ IV
(2011); Hans von der Hagen, SoialrichterJfilgen Borchert "Warum die Agenda 2010 als Erfog begriffen wird,
ist mir ein Ratsel", SODDEUTSCHE, (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:06 PM),
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/sozialrichter-juergen-borchert-warum-die-agenda-als-
erfolg-begriffen-wird-ist-mir-ein-raetsel-1.1623776 (explaining how German companies have be-
nefited from the decision).
96. Tax-Free Subsistence Minimum Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] May 29, 1990, 82 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVER-
FGE] 60 (85) (citing GG BGBl. I, arts. 1, 20 (Ger.)).
97. See Hartz IV Case, 125 BVERFGE 175. See also Tax-Free Subsistence Minimum Case, 82
BVERFGE 60; KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 31, at 50, 623; Knut Hinrichs, Die Entwicklung des
Rechts der Armut Zgum modernen Recht der EsxitenZsicherung, in HANDBUCH ARMUT UND SOZIALE AUS-
GRENZUNG 195, 203 (Ernst-Ulrich Huster et al. eds., 2008).
98. Hartz IV Case, 125 BVERFGE 175 (238).
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With respect to the constitutionally invalid Hartz IV calculation, the
Court found that the Bundestag ran afoul of this prinajle of legislative consistency
because, without further research or an empirical basis, it had withdrawn
or reduced the value of some of the goods and services it considered when
calculating the amount of support to be provided.99 The Court explained
that these freely-formed estimates, fashioned by the parliament seemingly
at random, violated the guarantee of a subsistence minimum because they
could not be empirically and rationally justified.'0 0
The remarkable lesson to be learned from the Court's Hartz IV Case
with respect to the German principle of democracy is that "rational" deci-
sion-making - understood as objective, systematic, consistent, and empir-
ically justifiable policy choices - also must be counted as one of the doc-
trine's constituent elements. This is a revolutionary demand to make of a
parliament, which ought to function at the irrational nexus of politics,
power, and persuasion within the process of republican, majoritarian deci-
sion-making. Indeed, political science research, relying on game theory and
social choice theory, urges us to view legislators as self-interested, "goal-
seeking agents who choose from available strategic alternatives to further
their ends."' 0 ' In this view, each individual representative actualizes his or
her self-interest, demanding enough personal benefit from a proposed
norm in order to justify his or her vote.1 02 The regard representatives are
likely to give to the objective integrity and methodological consistency of
their choices (the very demands made by the Constitutional Court's Hartq
IV Case) competes with other, often more pressing factors.
These other considerations that influence representatives' choices in-
volve interwoven personal and institutional dynamics. On the personal
side are a respective legislator's interest in: winning re-election, which pro-
duces shifting degrees of risk-taking and risk-aversion; minimizing costs in
time, energy, reputation, and other resources needed for his or her work;
winning favor from party leaders or maintaining the favor of the party's
rank-and-file membership; and any personal affinity for other legislators
involved or for particular subjects.' 03 Among the institutional dynamics
informing a representative's strategic approach to a particular policy debate
99. Id. at 211.
100. Id. at 237 ("The valuing decision as to what expenditure is counted among the subsistence
minimum is to be taken by the legislature handing down the provision in an expedient, justifiable
manner. Reductions in expenditure items in the divisions of the sample survey on income and ex-
penditure require an empirical basis for their justification.").
101. John A. Ferejohn & Morris P. Fiorina, Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior, 65 AM. ECON.
REV. 407, 407 (1975). See also JOHN FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS (1974); Manfred Prisching,
The Limited Raionality of Democracy: Schumpeter as the Founder of Irrational Choice Theor, 9 CRITICAL REV.
301 (1995); Richard F. Fenno, Jr., U.S. House Members in Their Consituencies: An Exploration, 71 AM.
POL. SCi. REV. 883 (1977); BRIAN BARRY, THE POLITICAL ARGUMENT (1965).
102. Ferejohn & Fiorina, supra note 101, at 411.
103. Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspecive on Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI.
245, 249-253 (1979).
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is the centralized or decentralized nature of the legislative body, with the
U.S. Congress representing the former and parliamentary bodies, such as
the German Bundestag, representing the latter. Parliamentary systems, under
the cudgel of no-confidence votes, exhibit significant party cohesion and
discipline amongst legislators.' 04 But even in decentralized legislative insti-
tutions, "party-membership is the single most important predictor of roll
call votes . . . ."'' A representative's choices are also colored by the partic-
ular institution's socialization and sanctioning techniques.' Institutional
arrangements, such as committee assignments, committee expertise, and
preliminary review by committees also influence a representative's legisla-
tive choices.' 07 Additionally, the role of ministries and lobbyists must be
accounted for as part of the institutional framework that will shape a rep-
resentative's legislative strategy.'0 s Significantly, the application of rational
choice theory to illuminate both the personal and institutional dynamics
shaping legislative decision-making depends on the highly questionable
assumption of perfect or near-perfect information flows about each of
these factors to and amongst legislators.
This, of course, is not an exhaustive catalogue of the factors that inform
a representative's decision-making. I raise them here only to establish that
legislative practice is dominated by factors that have little to do with a pol-
icy's objective integrity, internal coherence, or methodological consistency.
But these are the very elements that the Constitutional Court's principle of
legislative consistency elevates to a constitutional mandate.
This is an almost naive vision of politics and lawmaking, which lends
the Court's assertion of these demands even greater weight. Against all of
the unseemly expectations that we have for our lawmakers, the Constitu-
tional Court has insisted upon an ideal of democracy that involves rational
and coherent decision-making.
104. Daniel Diermeier & Timothy J. Feddersen, Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence
Procedure, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611 (1998); Andre Biichtiger & Marco R. Steenbergen, The Real
World of Deliberation: A Comparative Study of its Favorable Conditions in Legislatures 6 (Eur. Univ. Inst., EUI
Working Paper No. 2004/17, 2004), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/2634/
sps2004-17.pdfsequence=1.
105. Ferejohn and Fiorina find this to be true in the "centralized" American Congress. See Fere-
john & Fiorina, supra note 101, at 411-13. Others have made a similar finding with respect to "decen-
tralized" parliaments, such as the German Bundestag See, e.g., Michael Becher & Ulrich Sieberer, Disci-
pline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag- 1983-1994, 17 GER. POL. 293, 294, 297 (2008)
(finding, for example, that "more than seventy per cent of all legislators never deviate from the line
of their party"); William M. Chandler, Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, Agenda Control in the
Bundestag, 1980-2002, 15 GER. POL. 27-48 (2006); CHRISTOPHER KAM, PARTY DISCIPLINE AND
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (2009).
106. Weingast, supra note 103, at 259 (citing RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE
PURSE 128, 208 (1966)).
107. Id. See also Becher & Sieberer, supra note 105, at 293-94.
108. See, e.g., Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, Lobbing Legislatures, 110 J. POL. ECON.
919 (2002).
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D. 'Yes. .. But" or "So . .. What"?
It is reasonable to wonder, however, whether the Court's objections to
further European integration - invoking the principle of democracy -
amount to anything more than "Sturm und Drang."'"9 After all, the "yes" in
what I have described as the Court's "yes . . . but" jurisprudence means
that, in almost every case and despite its profound anxiety, the Court has
approved of Germany's participation in the most significant steps toward
deeper European integration." 0 It certainly has done so with respect to the
Euro-crisis bailouts, which were seen as (the latest) very real, existential
turning-points in the history of the European project. For all of its demo-
cratic bluster, the Court's reinforcement of the principle of democracy has
not been an actionable limit on European integration in the cases with
which it has been presented. This suggests that, if it is faced with the cold,
hard choice between German democracy as an expression of Germany's
constitutional identity and the fate of Europe, then the Court will always
blink, finding ever-more creative ways to permit the latest European initia-
tive while taking solace in an increasingly alarming but impotent rhetoric
about the Demokratieprin p. This is neither a fair nor accurate critique.
First, it is not fair to accuse the Court of a lack of sovereigntist resolve
in the face of ever-deeper European integration. The Basic Law has left
the Court with the unenviable task of negotiating a seemingly irresolvable
conflict between maintaining Germany's constitutional identity (marked to
a significant degree by the principle of democracy and secured for eternity
by Article 79(3)) and, alternately, Germany's constitutionally mandated
participation in European unification (demanded by the Basic Law's pre-
amble and Article 23)."' The Court could no more jeopardize the Europe-
109. "'Sturm und Drang' [Storm and Stress] is the name of a fairly brief (approximately 1767-1786)
but highly productive period in German literature situated between the literary manifestations of the
Enlightenment and Weimar Classicism. This period is also calied Genieteit [the era of 'universal',
'original' or 'powerful' genius]. The established English translation 'Storm and Stress' is not entirely
felicitous: 'passion and energy' or 'energy and rebellion' would be more appropriate." Gerhard P.
Knapp, Sturm and Drang [Storm and Stress], in THE LITERARY ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 13, 2003), available
at http://www.1itencyc.com/php/stopics.php?rec=true&UID=1
2 6 6 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). See
Edward P. Harris, Friedrich Maximilian von Klinger, in GERMAN WRITERS IN THE AGE OF GOETHE:
STURM UND DRANG TO CLASSICISM (Games N. Hardin & Christoph E. Schweitzer eds., 7th ed.
1990); MAX RIEGER, KLINGER IN DER STURM- UND DRANGPERIODE (1880).
110. An exception is the Court's European Arrest Warrant Case from 2005, in which the Court
ruled that Germany's participation in the European Arrest Warrant system would violate Article
16(2) (prohibiting the extradition of Germans except to other European states that observe the rule
of law). This, however, is not a perfect analogy because the arrest warrant functioned on the basis of
the European Union's "third piliar," intergovernmental authority, and not its "first-pillar," suprana-
tional authority. European Arrest Warrant Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Consti-
tutional Court] July 18, 2005, 113 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
[BVERFGE] 273. See FRANK SCHORKOPF, DER EUROPAISCHE HAFTBEFEHL VOR DEM BUNDES-
VERFASSUNGSGERICHT (2006).
111. See Janid, supra note 34, at 340-41 ("The Basic Law (Grundgeset) does not even permit the
European Union to become a state. The relinquishment of German sovereignty to an international or
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an project by preventing Germany's participation in fundamental initiatives
such as the ESM than it could utterly neglect the principle of democracy in
a head-long rush to European sovereignty. Confronting this Scylla and
Charybdis, the Court cannot be faulted for trying to navigate its way
through the conflicting constitutional commands, even if to this point that
has meant listing in the direction of the swirling abyss of European inte-
gration.
Second, the critique is also not entirely accurate, as it ignores the fact
that the Court has now mapped an unambiguous range of absolute outer
limits on Germany's participation in European integration. It may have
shaped this doctrine in a series of cases in which those limits were not ex-
ceeded, and thus, Germany was allowed to proceed with its involvement in
the ESM, EFSF, and Lisbon Treaty. Yet, with the "... bul' element of its
European jurisprudence, the Court has established a number of increasing-
ly concrete limits that leave no further room for maneuver when it is con-
fronted with the inevitable next phases of European integration. The des-
perate and creative measures being pursued by Europe as the Euro-crisis
drags on - measures that often involve previously unimagined degrees of
political union - suggest that it is only a matter of time until these more
concrete limits are reached.
The Court's brinkmanship in this regard can be illustrated by a few ex-
amples. In ruling that Germany's participation in the EFSF was constitu-
tional, the Court nevertheless declared that
"the German Bundestag may not transfer its budgetary re-
sponsibility to other entities by means of imprecise budg-
etary authorisations .... [It] may not deliver itself up to
any mechanisms with financial effect which . . . may result
in. incalculable burdens with budget significance without
prior mandatory consent, whether these are expenses or
losses of revenue."112
This characterization of Germany's domestic constitutional limitations on
European integration was informed and reinforced by the Court's conclu-
sions about parallel boundaries at the supranational level that also make
the "direct or indirect communitarisation of state debts" unacceptable as a
supranational organization beyond an association of sovereign states is prohibited. It would only be
permitted if the German people, acting jointly as pouvoir consituant, decided so by adopting a new
constitution pursuant to Article 146 of the Basic Law. Therefore, as long as the current Basic Law is
in force, the national parliaments of the Member States will remain the primary source of the Union's
democratic legitimization and the European Parliament the secondary one.") (footnotes omitted).
112. EFSF Case, 129 BVERFGE 124 (179).
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matter of European law." 3 This cryptic language has been widely inter-
preted as a firm prohibition on German participation in a Euro-Bonds
scheme through which the Euro-Zone countries would mutualize debt,
thereby making Germany (and other countries with stable budgets) liable
for the budgetary decisions of other Member States. If these commenta-
tors are correct, the Court will have to refuse Germany's participation in a
"transfer union."" 4
Another, more incendiary example of the concrete boundaries the
Court has set - and will presumably enforce when confronted with the
relevant circumstances - involves the persistent, albeit still-distant, goal
that ongoing processes of ever-closer European integration will serve as
steps leading inevitably and inexorably towards comprehensive European
political union in the form of a European federal state. The Court's con-
clusive rejection of that possibility under current domestic and European
legal frameworks in the Lisbon Treaty Case was such a decisive, disruptive
blow to the European dream that it left some commentators struggling to
find words strong enough to properly characterize their shock. French so-
ciologist Alfred Grosser, for one, called the Court's decision "a black day
in the history of Europe" and "bizarre," and left him questioning whether
Germany had ever been "serious about Europe.""'5 The Court earned this
ire by concluding that the European unification achieved by the Lisbon
Treaty constituted a Staatenverbund (an association of sovereign states) un-
der traditional public international law, and not a Staatsverband (an autono-
mous state polity consisting in federal sub-sovereigns)."6 As the only
achievable response to the failed European Constitution, the Court under-
scored that "the Treaty of Lisbon decided against the concept of a Euro-
pean federal state."" 7
113. Id. at 181.
114. See "Urteil ist klare Absage an Euro-Bonds", HANDELSBLATrt (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:32 AM), http:
//www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/reaktionen-urteil-ist-klare-absage-an-euro-bonds/458
4524.html; Franz C. Mayer & Christian Heidfeld, Eurobonds, Episode I: The Phantom Menace, VERFAS-
SUNGSBLOG (May 30, 2012), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/eurobonds-episode-i-the-phantom-
menace/#.UY66WOzDZ4; Franz C. Mayer & Christian Heidfeld, Eurobonds, Episode II: "Bail out
Member States you not must!", VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 31, 2012), http://www.verfassungs
blog.de/de/eurobonds-episode-ii-bail-out-member-states-you-not-must/#.UY65vOzD Z4; Franz
C. Mayer & Christian Heidfeld, Eurobonds, Episode III: Don't underestimate the Force - Eurobonds and
Verfassung, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (June 1, 2012), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/eurobonds-episo
de-iii-dont-underestimate-the-force-eurobonds-und-verfassung/#.UxOewGCYaM8; Franz C. Mayer
& Christian Heidfeld, Eurobonds, Episode IV: A New Hope?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (June 3, 2012), http:
//www.verfassungsblog.de/en/eurobonds-episode-iv-a-new-hope/#.UxOitmCYaM8; Franz C. May-
er & Christian Heidfeld, Eurobonds, Episode VI - The Return of the Jedi: Pjektbonds, VERFAS-
SUNGSBLOG (June 5, 2012), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/eurobonds-episode-vi-the-r
eturn-of-the-jedi-projektbonds/#.UY67WezDZ4.
115. Alfred Grosser, The Federal Constitutional Court's Lisbon Case: Germany's "Sonden'eg" - An
Outsider's Perrpective, 10 GER. L.J. 1263, 1263, 1264, 1266 (2009), available at http://www.germanlawjou
rnal.com/pdfs/VollONoO8/PDF Vol_10_No_08_1263-1266 Lisbon%20SpecialGrosser.pdf.
116. Lisbon Treaty Case, 123 BVERFGE 267 (350).
117. Id. at 370-71.
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The Court's characterization of the European project as an undertaking
in international law and not supranational constitutional law led the Court
to two absolute limits on Germany's participation in the European project.
First, the Court insisted that all deeper levels of integration must be
achieved by transfers of sovereign authority through the mechanisms of
public international law, and that these transfers must be susceptible to
revocation, even to the point of secession."' The European Union, the
Court said, remains the creation of sovereign democratic states and is gov-
erned by the classical principles of public international law."'9 The Court
identified a number of European and domestic legal devices through
which this principle is expressed and reinforced, including the principle of
conferral,120 the principle of subsidiarity,'121 limits on the European Union's
authority to work independent changes to its primary law,' 22 depriving the
European Union of the authority to expand its competence, 23 and the
principle that European Union law does not enjoy unrestricted preemptory
force over the law of the Member States (as it would in a federal state).124
Second, the Court concluded that the Basic Law - or its ordinary
amendment procedures - could not accommodate Germany's participa-
tion in a European Union enjoying the character of a federal state. The
fundamental loss of state sovereignty involved in this development, the
Court explained, "would require a free decision of the people in Germany
beyond the present applicability of the Basic Law." 25 There can be no dis-
solution of the Federal Republic of Germany, even through the processes
of European integration, except via the impossible-to-imagine dissolution
of the Basic Law itself. 126 The Court summed up this absolute limit on
Germany's participation in European integration in these terms: "The
Basic Law strives to integrate Germany into the legal community of peace-
ful states, but does not waive the sovereignty contained in the last instance
in the German constitution as a right of the people to [m]ake constitution-
al decisions concerning fundamental questions [such] as its own identi-
,y-,127
Finally, the "much ado . . . but nothing" critique of the Court's Europe-
an jurisprudence is inaccurate because it discounts the expressive contribu-
tion that the Court's rhetoric has made to the German debate over Euro-
118. Id. at 350, 395-96.
119. Id. at 378-79.
120. Id. at 381-82.
121. Id. at 383-84.
122. Lisbon Treaty Case, 123 BVERFGE 267 (384, 434).
123. Id. at 392-93.
124. Id. at 400.
125. Id. at 364.
126. Id. at 343, 370.
127. Id. at 400-01.
2014] 605
606 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
pean integration. Even if it is hard to establish causality, it is meaningful
that Germans - especially German elites - are increasingly voicing their
skepticism towards European integration at the same time that the cau-
tionary tone offered by the Constitutional Court - one of Germany's
most respected social institutions - has come to attract increasing atten-
tion in the German media. This nascent political movement invokes the
Constitutional Court's framework for European reluctance, emphasizing
Europe's democratic deficit and the risks of integration for Germany's
constitutional identity. This, in turn, makes the Constitutional Court a pre-
ferred forum for the assertion of these concerns. The civil society organi-
zation Mehr Demokratie (More Democracy) was supported by more than
37,000 Germans when filing one of the complaints that led to the Court's
ESM Temporary Injunction Case.128 The rhetoric was also discernible in the
2013 election platform of the newly-formed political party Alternative fur
Deutschland (Alternative for Germany), which advocated "an orderly disso-
lution of the Euro-Currency Zone," "the unrestricted budgetary authority
of the national parliaments," and "the strengthening of democracy and
democratic civil rights." 2 9 In a survey taken just weeks after the new par-
ty's founding, nearly a fifth of the Germans polled said that they would
give Alternative for Germany their votes.'o
The breadth of the reception of the Court's expressed, yet unrealized,
hesitance towards Europe is further confirmed by the fact that, in the
midst of the series of cases described in this Article, Justice Udo Di Fabio
retired. Justice Di Fabio, a nominee to the Court from the center-right
Christian Democratic Union, had been described by one commentator as
the Constitutional Court's "most Eurosceptic judge."' 3 1 He was the Se-
cond Senate's Rapporteur for International and European Law, and it is
widely accepted that the Lisbon Treaty Case largely bears his influence.132
128. See Mehr Demokratie zur EZB-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, MEHR DEM-
OKRATIE (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.mehr-demokratie.de/6033.html?&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=5859&tx-ttnews%5Btt-news%5D= 1 5038&cHash=228f440adf2537374ba51af21dela5b5.
129. Wabprogramm Parteitagsbeschluss vom 14.04.2013, ALTERNATIVE FOR DEUTSCHLAND, https://
www.alternativefuer.de/pdf/Wahlprogramm-AFD.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
130. Dietmar Neuerer, 19 Proent wirden die Anti-Euro-Partei weihlen, HANDELSBLATr (Apr. 22,
2013, 6:18 AM), http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/repraesentative-umfrage-19-pr
ozent-wuerden-die-anti-euro-partei-waehlen/8094336.html. As it turned out, the party won just 4.7%
of the vote in the September 2013 election. See Narrow Failure - Will Germany's Anti-Euro AFD Pary
Implode?, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Sept. 25, 2013, 4:15 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/ger
many/german-euroskeptic-party-afd-could-unravel-after-election-a-924498.html (Ella Ornstein
trans.).
131. Arthur Dyevre, The CZecb Ultra Vires Revolution: Isolated Acaident or Omen of Judicial Armaged-
don?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/the-czech-ultra-vires-
revolution-isolated-accident-or-omen-of-judicial-armageddon/#.UYhO2-zDZ4.
132. Reinhard Miiller, Das Bundesverfassungsgeicht und der EU-Vertrag Entscheidung fber Deutschlands
"existentielle Staatlicbkeit," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, June 17, 2008, available at http://
www.faz.net/akruell/politik/staat-und-recht/das-bundesverfassungsgericht-und-der-eu-vertrag-ent
scheidung-ueber-deutschlands-existentielle-staatlichkeit-1539978.html ("Berichterstatter Udo Di
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But the subsequent EFSF Case and ESM Temporary Injunction Case were de-
cided by the Second Senate after Justice Di Fabio's retirement and after
the Senate came under the reins of the Court's new President, Andreas
Vo~kuhle. Nominated by the center-left Social Democratic Party, Justice
Vo8kuhle comfortably fits with Germany's pro-European consensus,
notwithstanding his role in deciding the EFSF and ESM Temporary Injunc-
tion cases. But Justice Vol3kuhle's Court has faithfully maintained Justice
Di Fabio's Euro-cautious jurisprudence, especially its emphasis on the
principle of democracy. In an interview given shortly after the Court pub-
lished its EFSF judgment, Justice Vof3kuhle declared: "the Basic Law
won't admit of much more Europe." 34
More than "so what," the Court's European jurisprudence would be
better understood as "yes . . .but with grave reservations for the future."
E. Summary
The Court's recent European decisions, its jurisprudence involving the
broad range of issues concerning democratic and political representation,
and the Court's recent Harq IV Case provide us with the contours of the
principle of democracy. It is chiefly a valorization of fully-informed, ra-
tional, parliamentary governance exercised on behalf of the electorate by a
plurality of widely representative political parties in open debate over pub-
lic policy. The Court has vigilantly applied this vision of democracy as the
standard against which Germany's participation in the project of European
integration will be tested. Despite the equivocal "yes ... but" posture the
Court strikes in those cases, the principle of democracy functions as the
primary limitation on Germany's role in a Europe that needs the country's
deep involvement and leadership. Among the many forces arrayed against
Fabio ist aber nicht nur fiir das Verfahren zun Vertrag von Lissabon zustandig, in dem es etwa um
demokratische Defizite gehen wird, sondern auch fir ein weiteres heifes europliisches Eisen: Es geht
urn den Kompetenzstreit zwischen Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europiiischem Gerichtshof."
["But Rapporteur Udo Di Fabio is not only responsible for the case involving the Lisbon Treaty,
which will be somewhat preoccupied with the 'democratic deficit'. He is also responsible for a slightly
hotter European topic: the competence struggle between the German Federal Constitutional Court
and the European Court of Justice."]).
133. See, e.g., Andreas Volkuhle, Muldlevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Eu-
ropaische Verfasungsgericbtsverbund, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 175, 196, 197 (2010) (referring to a German
"responsibility for integration" and a "common European constitutional order"); Andreas Vo8kuhle,
Das Leitbild des "europdischenjuristen" - Gedanken turjuristenausbildung und .ur Rechtskultur in Deutscbland,
in 1 RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 326 (2010) (arguing for legal training that abandons the parochial, na-
tional, and positivisitic orientation of the German tradition and instead pursues an education that
prepares European, cosmopolitan lawyers equipped to engage in and lead the Europeanization and
globalization of the law).
134. Melanie Amann & Inge Kloepfer, Im Gesprach: Andreas Vofkuhle - 'Mehr Europa lIart das
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Europe's future, the German principle of democracy, as it is currently un-
derstood and enforced by the Constitutional Court, will remain a persistent
irritant - if not an existential threat - to the project of European inte-
gration.'3 5
III. HABERMAS'S TRAP: EUROPE IN THE VISE OF GERMAN
DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY
The German Court's interpretation of the principle of democracy is no
improvised democratic theory. It is a nearly complete realization of Ger-
man philosopher Jirgen Habermas's discourse theory of democracy. I
substantiate this claim in the following Part and, by doing so, I am able to
provide theoretical grounding to the picture of the principle of democracy
painted above. One fundamental departure in the Court's deployment of
Habermas's theory - the insistence that democratic discourse take place
within the framework of a traditional state - provides a final, significant
element to our understanding of the DemokratieprinZip. But recognizing the
Habermasian heritage of the Court's interpretation of the principle of de-
mocracy casts light on an astounding, historic, and deeply German irony. I
am suggesting that the Constitutional Court's Habermasian, albeit state-
centric, understanding of the Demokratiepin!yp constitutes one of the chief
obstacles to European integration, despite the fact that Habermas has been
one of Germany's most determined and visionary advocates for European
supranationalism.
It is easy to see the Habermasian orientation of the Court's framing of
the principle of democracy, and there is every reason to believe that the
justices at Germany's highest court - many of whom are themselves con-
stitutional law scholars of the first rank - might be (consciously or un-
consciously) engaged with Habermas's theoretical work. In fact, Haber-
mas's influence on the Court's jurisprudence has been considered by many
scholars.1 36 Of course, Habermas is extensively, and censoriously, occupied
135. Should there be any doubt, the Court is once again considering a challenge to a dramatic
measure of European integration. In June 2013, the Court heard arguments on a challenge to the
European Central Bank's declared intention to buy, if necessary to salvage the Euro, the bonds of
Euro-zone countries whose crippling debt prevents them from effectively participating in the bond
market. See Jack Ewing, Debate on the Euro's Future in a German Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/economy/german-court-weighs-bond-b
uying-by-european-central-bank.html?r=0; Stefan Kaiser, Crisis Course: High Court Skeptical of ECB
Bond Buys, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (une 12, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/internation
al/europe/german-high-court-skeptical-of-ecb-bond-buying-a-905246.html.
136. See HUGH BAXTER, HABERMAS: THE DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
(2011); MATrHEW SPECTER, HABERMAS: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (2010); Andris Saj6,
ConstitutionalAdjudication in Light of Discourse Theory, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRIT-
ICAL EXCHANGES 336 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998); Bernhard Schlink, The Dy-
namics of ConstitutionalAdjudication, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES
371 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998).
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with the Constitutional Court in Chapter Six of his seminal work, Between
Facts and Norms.137 He describes the Court as "the reflexive apex in the hi-
erarchy of adjudication" and acknowledges its role in increasing the clarity
of the law and safeguarding the coherence of the legal order.'3 The greater
portion of Chapter Six, however, reveals Habermas's disapproving view of
the Constitutional Court. On the basis of a comparison with the jurispru-
dence of the U.S. Supreme Court, Habermas concludes that the Constitu-
tional Court suffers from a "legitimacy problem" that is rooted, above all,
in the Court's values jurisprudence.' 39
Habermas's discourse theory of democracy sits uncomfortably along-
side the Constitutional Court's values jurisprudence - what Constitution-
al Court Justice Bockenforde called a "tyranny of values"140 - which is
applied chiefly to the interpretation and enforcement of the Basic Law's
fundamental rights. But this order of "material value ethics," or "objective
order of values," gives way in the structural constitutional sphere in which
the principle of democracy operates.14' The Court's decisions in this area,
as outlined in the earlier portions of this Article, speak to procedural guar-
antees in parliamentary practice, including rights of participation, rights of
full information, and an obligation to pursue rational decision-making.
This aligns with Habermas's discursive politics, which argues that only
those laws are legitimate to which all members of the community can as-
sent in a discursive process. 42 The key features of the theory are participa-
tion, full information, rational decision-making, and a deliberative infra-
structure (such as a parliament) that is established by the constitution. 43
Especially the latter - deliberative infrastructure - is achieved by the
priority the Constitutional Court has given the Bundestag in its interpreta-
tion of the principle of democracy. Habermas speaks favorably of a high-
er-level intersubjectivity of communication that unfolds in parliamentary
bodies pursuing modes of communication in a process of more or less
rational opinion- and will-formation concerning issues and problems af-
fecting society as a whole.'" As outlined above, in its recent European ju-
137. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 238-286 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
138. Id at 240, 243.
139. Id. at 253, 261.
140. Id at 254 (citing ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, GRUNDRECHTE ALS GRUNDSATZ-
NORMEN, STAAT, VERFASSUNG, DEMOKRATIE 186 (1991)).
141. Id at 254. See Liith Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Jan. 15, 1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 198 (205);
JORN IPSEN, STAATSRECHT II: GRUNDRECHTE 30-31 (15th ed. 2012); CHRISTOPH MOLLERS, DAS
GRUNDGESETZ: GESCHICHTE UND INHALT (2009); THILO RENSMANN, WERTORDNUNG UND
VERFASSUNG (2007); Robert Alexy, ConsfituionalRghts, Balancin& and Raionak#y, 16 RATIo JURIS 131,
133 (2003). See also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 31, at 57-58.
142. HABERMAS, supra note 137, at 110.
143. Id at 299.
144. JORGEN HABERMAS, Three Normaive Models of Democracy, in THE INCLUSION OF THE 0TH-
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risprudence, the Constitutional Court has offered the Bundestag its vigilant
constitutional protection. The parliament, the Court insisted in the ESM
Temporary Injunction Case, must remain "permanently the master of its deci-
sions." 45 Underscoring another element of Habermas's discourse theory
of democracy, the Court also insisted that the Bundestag's "democratic de-
velopment of informed opinion" requires that the Bundestag "have access
to the information it needs to assess the fundamental bases and conse-
quences of its decision."146 Emphasizing yet another element of Haber-
mas's discourse theory in the HartZ IV Case, the Constitutional Court spec-
tacularly insisted on rational - as opposed to power-oriented or strate-
gic - justifications in parliamentary decision-making.1
47 Finally, the
Court's broader treatment of parliamentary democracy and political repre-
sentation under the Basic Law strongly reinforces Habermas's insistence
on broad participation in the Bundestag.148 All of the elements of discourse
theory are thus present in the Court's interpretation of the principle of
democracy: fully-informed, rational, parliamentary governance exercised
on behalf of the electorate by a plurality of widely representative political
parties in open debate over public policy.
Many scholars have seen a potential link between the Basic Law's prin-
ciple of democracy and Habermas's discourse theory.149 In at least one in-
stance, Habermas's influence has been attributed more specifically to the
Court's application of the Demokraiepringp in the context of its European
cases. Frank Schorkopf noted that, in the pivotal Lisbon Treaty Case, the
German Constitutional Court's "reasoning refers to a discursive pro-
cess - possibly a reference to the much-lauded deliberative model of so-
ciety."' 5 0 Schorkopf means to draw attention to a passage in the Lisbon
ER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 239, 248-49 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998).
145. ESM Temporary Injunction Case, 132 BVERFGE 195 (1 213) (quoting EFSF Case, 129
BVERFGE 124 (179-80) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
146. Id 210,215.
147. Hartz IV Case, 125 BVERFGE 175 (238). See ANDREW EDGAR, HABERMAS: THE KEY
CONCEPTS 40 (2006) ("In effect, [according to Habermas] the constitution guarantees that all citizens
have equal rights to challenge any legal reform, and to receive a reasoned reply to their objections. . .
(emphasis added).
148. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 31, at 300-301. See Michael Brenner, The Constitutional
Framework of Democratic Representation, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, UNIVERSALISM AND DEMOCRACY: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 135 (Christian Starck ed., 1999); Helmut Steinberger, Polical Representation
in Germany, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW 121 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald Kommers eds., 1993);
Georg Ress, The Constitution and the Requirements of Democracy in Germany, in NEW CHALLENGES TO
THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 111 (Christian Starck ed., 1991); Klein & Giegerich, supra note 47.
149. See BAXTER, supra note 136; SPECTER, supra note 136; BURKHARD WILK, DIE POLITISCHE
IDEE DER INTEGRATION (2011); SILJA VONEKY, RECHT, MORAL UND ETHIK (2010); Niels Pe-
tersen, Demokratie und Grundgesety.- Veraihderungen des Demokraieprinps in Art. 20 Abs. 2 GG angesichts
der Herausforderungen moderner Staatfichkeit, 58 JAHRB. OFFENTL. RECHTS GEGENWART 137 (2010);
MARCEL KAUFMANN, EUROPAISCHE INTEGRATION UND DEMOKRATIEPRINZIP (1997); Albert
Bleckmann, Das Demokraiepringly der Europaiscben Gemeinschaft, in STUDIEN ZUM EUROPAISCHEN
GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT 175 (Albert Bleckmann ed., 1986).
150. Frank Schorkopf, The European Union as an Association ofSoverrign States: Karlsruhe's Ruiing on
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Treaty Case in which the Court concludes that the new possibilities for civil
society engagement in European policy-making established by the Lisbon
Treaty are not enough to fulfill the constitutional obligation imposed by
the principle of democracy. The Court explained that the deliberative par-
ticipation of citizens and their civic organizations allowed by the Lisbon
Treaty "cannot replace the legitimizing connection based on elections and
other votes," even as those "elements of participative democracy can . . .
complement the legitimation of European public authority" by making
"the primary representative and democratic connection of legitimation
more effective." 51 It would be wrong to read this as the Court's general
rejection of, or disregard for, Habermasian discourse theory in relation to
the principle of democracy. Here, the Court merely concludes that one
facet of the theory operating alone - broad public participation in deci-
sion-making - will not be enough to fulfill the demands of the Demo-
kraieprin!jp. The Court insists upon a fuller form of discursive democracy,
including full information leading to rational decisions in a parliament in
which political parties play a leading role in political opinion- and will-
formation.
It is a breathtaking irony that the Constitutional Court's insistence on
the elements of discourse theory in its interpretation of the principle of
democracy should now serve as an obstacle to deeper European integra-
tion. After all, Jirgen Habermas is one of the most devoted advocates for
European supranationalism.' 52 Among the many honors his decades of
work have won him, Habermas is also the 2013 Erasmus Prize laureate,
which recognizes his "exceptional contribution to culture, [through] schol-
arship, in Europe."' 53 Habermas's commitment to Europe has theoretical
and political bases.
As a theoretical matter, Habermas sees a supranational institution, such
as the European Union, as the necessary response to what he refers to as
the "postnational constellation."' 54 For Habermas, the postnational con-
stellation is a matter of historical fact. It is the contemporary consequence
of market, political, communication, and technological developments often
characterized as "globalization" that have led to a "relentless process of
the Treaty ofLirbon, 10 GER. L.J. 1219, 1224 (2009).
151. Lisbon Treaty Case, 123 BVERFGE 123 (369).
152. See HABERMAS, supra note 2. See also EDGAR, supra note 147 ("Habermas thus remains a
forceful proponent of international organisations, such as the United Nations and the European
Community." (citation omitted)).
153. Erasmus Prige, PRAEMIUM ERASMIANUM FOUND., http://www.erasmusprijs.org/index.cfm?
lang=en&page=Erasmusprijs; Former Laureates: firgen Habermas 2013, PRAEMIUM ERASMIANUM
FOUND., http://www.erasmusprijs.org/index.cfm?lang=en&page=Prijswinnaars&mode=detail&it
emlD=53AFB450-04FC-1371-9AE18BB1978B2677.
154. JORGEN HABERMAS, The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, in THE POST-
NATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 58 (Max Pensky trans., 2001).
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dissolution" of familiar governing structures such as the traditional nation-
state.'s On the one hand, the forces of globalization have produced in-
creasingly plural and heterogeneous societies (if the old myth of homoge-
neous nations were ever true) that displace the old social structures that
informed "national consciousness," including descent, language, and
shared history.156 On the other hand, globalization has eroded the state's
capacity to compensate for the loss of national consciousness through a
program of tax-based sacrifice and social redistribution that ensured citi-
zens' equal enjoyment of individual rights and, thereby, purchased their
loyalty to the state. 57 Habermas accepts that "states no longer have con-
trol over their national territories; and [that] territorial and political bound-
aries are increasingly permeable.. . ."'ss His vision of the postnational
constellation is that of "overflowing rivers, washing away all the frontier
checkpoints and controls, and ultimately the bulwark of the nation it-
self." 59
The postnational constellation also has a normative basis, rooted in the
war generation's yearning for European peace and in the social democratic
politics of redistribution. That is, even if Habermas did not believe that the
process of de-nationalization was a matter of historical fact, he would nev-
ertheless advocate for supranationalism as a necessary "great transfor-
mation" capable of "pacifying a blood-drenched continent"'o60 and provid-
ing a geopolitical counterbalance to the Anglo-American, neo-liberal
commodification of the life-world."'
Thus, for Habermas, the facts and norms point to European suprana-
tionalism qua the European Union (if not a broader, Kantian international
order) as the functional equivalent of the old nation-state. Habermas's
struggle has been to defend the democratic potential of supranational gov-
ernance. According to the skeptics, the democratic deficit attributable to
the European Union - particularly in practice - results from the elite-
driven nature of the process of European integration and the lack of a
proper European demos, or society capable of participating in a European
democracy.162 Habermas does not dispute these critiques. But neither does
he see them as inevitable. And because they can be remedied, they do not
categorically exclude supranational democracy. He urges us to overcome
155. Id. at 87-88.
156. Id. at 64.
157. Id. at 76-77.
158. Id. at 61 (quoting Anthony McGrew, Globakaion and Territorial Democracy: An Introduction, in
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY? 12 (Anthony McGrew ed., 1997).
159. Id. at 67.
160. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 39, 61.
161. See Jiirgen Habermas, February 15, or What Binds Europeans, in THE DIVIDED WEST 39
(Ciaran Cronin trans. and ed., 2006); Jiirgen Habermas, Core Europe as a Counterpower?, in THE DIVID-
ED WEST, supra, at 49.
162. See supra note 37. See also HABERMAS, supra note 154, at 68-80.
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the mental habit of thinking of democracy as an exclusively state-based
institution in order to imagine democratic processes that transcend the
borders of the nation-state.1 6 3
This, however, is where his understanding differs fundamentally from
that of the Constitutional Court. As it gives force to Habermasian dis-
course theory in its interpretation of the principle of democracy, the Court
has done so in a way that thoroughly rejects Habermas's vision for the su-
pranational potential of discursive democracy. The discursive democracy
that the Constitutional Court has articulated is imagined as a set of pro-
cesses suited exclusively for the nation-state. There are doctrinal as well as
ideological explanations for this. As a national institution interpreting a
national constitution, the Constitutional Court can be forgiven for clinging
to a state-centric jurisprudence. This is especially true considering that, as
noted above, the German Basic Law imposes a doctrinal obligation on the
Court to preserve Germany's national, constitutional identity. But it is also
possible to read the Constitutional. Court's Demokraiepringj jurisprudence
as a political rejection of the grander ambitions for European political un-
ion.
This, then, must be the final defining feature of the Constitutional
Court's interpretation of the principle of democracy. The discursive de-
mocracy achieved by the Demokratieprinp, contrary to the hopes advanced
for the theory by Habermas himself, is a distinctly state-centered political
ideal. The statist orientation of the Court's understanding of discursive
democracy is underscored by the fact that it has chosen its Euro-cautious
jurisprudence as the forum for its clearest articulation of the meaning of
the principle of democracy. No wonder that, when reacting to the Consti-
tutional Court's ESM Case, Habermas complained that the Constitutional
Court hoped to rescue the nation-state when it claimed to be about the
business of defending democracy.'6 4
CONCLUSION
Germany, the old stalwart of European integration, is increasingly an
impediment to closer European unity. In large measure, this is due to the
German Federal Constitutional Court's continuing efforts to enforce the
German constitution's principle of democracy. No plan for further inte-
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unfreundliche Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, das sich gegen weitere Integra-
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gration, no measures of deeper political union, can ignore this. The Consti-
tutional Court will continue to insist that European integration respect the
DemokraiepingZi. This means that the Bundestag must exercise public au-
thority with respect to a wide swathe of issues. That is necessary, the Court
has explained, because only the Bundestag - and no European institu-
tion - can deliver the central elements of the principle of democracy, in-
cluding fully-informed, rational, parliamentary governance exercised on
behalf of the electorate by a plurality of widely representative political par-
ties in open debate over public policy. Finally, and despite Habermas's
commitment to European integration, it is the Constitutional Court's in-
sistence on the state orientation of its nearly complete implementation of
his discursive democratic theory that now stands in the way of the Euro-
pean dream.
